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NOTE
Uston v. Resorts International Hotel: An
Unwarranted Intrusion on the Common
Law Right of Exclusion
INTRODUCTION
The right to exclude others has been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court as one of the most essential components of
the bundle of rights attendant upon the ownership of private
property.' This right to exclude has evolved through the common
law2 and is protected by the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution. 3 However, the right to exclude is not absolute.
Courts have found an exception to the rule when the owner makes
the property available for public use, and the individual, while on
the premises, exercises a public right protected by the federal or
state constitutions.4 In these cases the courts have held that "the
more private property is devoted to public use, the more it must
accommodate the rights which inhere in individual members of
the general public who use that property."'5 Where the right
which the public wishes to exercise on privately owned property
devoted to public use is constitutionally protected, the courts are
justified in limiting the property owner's right to exclude. This is
because of the preferred position accorded those individual rights
compared with the property owner's common law right of exclu-
sion. However, in Uston v. Resorts International Hotel 6 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey limited a privately owned gambling
1. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
2. See infra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
3. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). The Court recog-
nized that "the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of
the property right, falls within the category of interests that the Government cannot
take without compensation." U.S. CONsT. Amend. V, provides in part: "Nor shall
any person.. . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
4. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). (Limit-
ing privately owned shopping center's right to exclude where Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia interpreted its state constitution as entitling its citizens to exercise free
expression and petition rights on shopping center property). State v. Schmid, 84 N.J.
535, 423 A.2d 516 (1980) (Applying Pruneyard principle to private university to which
the public was invited. New Jersey Constitution protects the exercise of free expres-
sion on private property devoted to public use. N.J. CONST. art. 1 para. 6).
5. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 562, 423 A.2d 615, 629; Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
6. 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982).
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casino's right to exclude certain patrons. They did this without
finding a competing individual right protected by the federal or
state constitutions.
This Note will first trace the evolution of the right to exclude.
Next, it will examine the exceptions to the right of exclusion rec-
ognized by the Federal and State courts. The Uston decision and
the criticism it has inspired will then be analyzed.
Finally, this Note will suggest alternative approaches the Uston
court might have adopted which would bar the casinos from ex-
cluding card counters while at the same time maintain a private
property owner's right to exclude.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE BY OWNERS OF
PLACES OF AMUSEMENT
In early English and American common law, many privately
owned businesses of public accommodation were held to have a
duty to serve the public without discrimination.7 Through the
passage of time, courts restricted this duty to certain callings
where the public's needs demanded its continuance.3 Innkeepers
and common carriers are the most notable illustrations of busi-
nesses which, under both the early and present common law, have
had a duty imposed on them not to discriminate in serving the
public.9 This obligation to serve the public has been described as
"a duty imposed by law from considerations of public policy."' 0
The rationale for this rule is that such exclusions would infringe
on the public's constitutional right to travel," as well as placing
the traveler's safety and security in jeopardy. An innkeeper or
common carrier's decision to exclude a potential patron must bear
a rational relationship, or causal nexus, between the reason for the
exclusion and their function as an inn or common carrier.' 2
7. See Arterburn, The Origin andFirst Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REV.
411 (1927); Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem,
17 HARv. L. REv. 156 (1904).
8. Id.
9. Weehawken Tp. v. Erie R.R. Co., 20 N.J. 572, 120 A.2d 593 (1956); Dela-
ware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N.J.L. 169, 19 A. 178 (1890); For a more recent
case see Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 71 N.J. 478, 366 A.2d 641 (1976) im-
posing on a privately owned hospital the duty not to discriminate in serving the public
because of the public's need of access to its services. See also Streeter v. Brogan, 113
N.J. Super. 486, 274 A.2d 312 (N.J. Ch. 1971).
10. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N.J.L. 169, 171, 19 A. 178, 179
(1890).
11. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). Recognized a right to travel as
an aspect of the "'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process
of law under the Fifth Amendment."
12. Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 71 N.J. 478, 488, 366 A.2d 641, 646
(1976). Reasons such as full occupancy, the traveler's condition, such as drunkeness
[Vol. 20
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Notwithstanding the duty imposed on innkeepers and common
carriers, amusement place owners have traditionally been ex-
cluded from such common law obligation due to the lack of com-
parable public policy considerations. Relevant decisions disclose
that owners of places of amusement, being under no obligations to
serve the public, could deny admission to whomever they
pleased.' 3 The majority view regarding the right of owners of
amusement places to exclude was summarized by the New York
Court of Appeals in Woollcott v. Shubert' 4 Therein, the court
stated:
[A] theater, while affected by a public interest which justified
licensing under the police power or for the purpose of revenue,
is in no sense public property or a public enterprise. It is not
governed by the rules which relate to common carriers or other
public utilities. The proprietor does not derive from the state
the franchise to initiate and conduct it. His right to and control
of it is the same as that of any private citizen in his property
and affairs. He has the right to decide who shall be admitted or
excluded.15
II. CONSTITUTIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT OF
EXCLUSION
Federal and state courts have recognized that a private property
owner's right to exclude is not absolute.16 Once the property
owner opens his property up to the general public, his right to
exclude has been held to be circumscribed by constitutionally pro-
tected rights belonging to the public entering upon the property.
A. Federal Decisions
This principle was first recognized in Marsh v. Alabama,17 a
1946 decision of the United States Supreme Court. Therein, Mrs.
Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, stood near the Post Office of Chicka-
or affliction with a contagious disease would constitute good cause for exclusion. See
Rex v. Ivens, 173 Eng. Rep. 94 (K.B. 1835). Arrival at an inn at a later hour or on a
Sunday held to be insufficient to deny lodging.
13. Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633 (1913); Garifme v. Mon-
mouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47, 148 A.2d 1 (1959); Madden v. Queens County
Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E. 697, 1 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1947); Foster v. Shubert
Holding Co., 316 Mass. 470, 55 N.E.2d 772 (1944); Finnesey v. Seattle Baseball Club,
Inc., 122 Wash. 276, 210 P. 679 (1922); Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn. 35,
185 S.W. 692 (1916).
14. 217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829 (1916).
15. Id at 216, 111 N.E. at 830. See Annot., Exclusion of Person (for reason other
than color or race) From Place ofPublic Entertainment orAmusement, 1 A.L.R.2d 1165
(1948); Turner & Kennedy, Exclusion, Ejection and Segregation of Theater Patrons, 32
IOvA L. REv. 625 (1947).
16. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
1984]
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saw, Alabama, and attempted to distribute religious literature.' 8
It would appear that this behavior was well within Mrs. Marsh's
first amendment rights 19 since access to streets and other similar
public places have historically been associated with the exercise of
such rights. However, the town of Chickasaw was, in its entirety,
privately owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. 20 Except
for the private ownership Chickasaw had all the characteristics of
any other American town.2' The corporate owner of Chickasaw
had posted notices in the stores stating no solicitation of any kind
would be permitted without written permission.22 After being
warned and refusing to stop her activities, Mrs. Marsh was ar-
rested and convicted under an Alabama statute23 which made it
illegal to enter or remain on private property after having been
told not to do so. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United
States held:
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it .... Since these facilities are built and operated primar-
ily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a
public function, it is subject to state regulation. 24
The Marsh Court recognized that when the constitutional rights
of owners of property25 are balanced against those of the people to
enjoy freedom of the press and religion, the latter occupy a pre-
ferred position.26 Therefore, it was quite reasonable to limit the
owner of Chickasaw's right to exclude, when the public wished to
exercise their first amendment right on private property opened to
the public.
Twenty-two years later, the Supreme Court extended its hold-
ing in Marsh by finding that a privately owned shopping center
18. Id. at 503.
19. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 316 (1968). U.S. CONST. amend I, provides in part: "Congress shall
make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."
20. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
21. Id. The property consisted of residential buildings, streets, a system of sew-
ers, a sewage disposal plant and a "business block" on which business places were
situated.
22. .1d at 503.
23. Id. at 504.
24. Id. at 506.
25. See supra note 3.
26. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). The Court recognized that "the
right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment 'lies at the founda-
tion of free government by free men'...."
[Vol. 20
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was the functional equivalent 27 of the business district of a town.
This decision came about in Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.28 The Court could see no
reason why access to a business district in a company town for the
purpose of exercising first amendment rights should be constitu-
tionally protected, while access, for that very same purpose, to
property functioning as a business district should be denied pro-
tection because the surrounding property is not under the same
ownership.29 The Court held that a "State may not delegate the
power, through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude
those members of the public wishing to exercise their First
Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose
generally consonant with the use to which the property is actually
put."'30 The effect of this decision was that the owner of a private
shopping center could not utilize state trespass laws to exclude
members of the public who wished to express their views relating
to shopping center operations.
However, two subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court,
Lloyd Corp., Ltd v. Tanner3 I and Hudgens v. NLRB, 32 brought an
end to the era of treating privately owned shopping centers like
company towns. In Lloyd, the Supreme Court reversed a lower
court's injunction allowing draft and war protesters to continue
distributing handbills peacefully on the shopping center prem-
ises.33 The Court distinguished the facts of Lloyd from Logan
Valle a4 and stated that "It would be an unwarranted infringe-
ment of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of
First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate al-
ternative avenues of communication exist."'35
Hudgens involved picketing by union members in front of a
27. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 318 (1968).
28. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
29. Id. at 319.
30. Id. at 319-20. Justice Black, the author of the Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946) opinion, vigorously dissented. Justice Black believed the majority com-
pletely misread Marsh. To Black, the sole issue in Marsh was under what circum-
stances can private property be treated as public. The answer given in Marsh is when
that property has taken on all the attributes of a town. Seeing only one similar fea-
ture between a town and a shopping center, Justice Black would not have held this
sufficient to confiscate a part of an owner's property and give it to people who wish to
picket on it. Id. at 327-32.
31. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
32. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
33. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 556 (1972).
34. Id. at 564-67. The Court noted that the handbilling in Lloydwas not directed
at any establishment in the shopping center as was the picketing in Logan Valley, and
that there were adequate alternative areas for such activities.
35. Id. at 567.
1984]
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 20 [2016], No. 3, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss3/7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
store leased by their employer in a privately owned shopping
center.36 The Court, after reviewing its prior decisions, found that
the reasoning in Lloyd and Logan Valley could not be squared
with one another, and that the rationale of Logan Valley did not
survive Lloyd37 In Hudgens the Court concluded "that under the
present state of the law the constitutional guarantee of free expres-
sion has no part to play in a case such as this."'38 Therefore, the
owner of a private shopping center may exclude members of the
public wishing to exercise their right of expression as protected by
the Constitution of the United States.
From this review of the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court pertaining to the right of exclusion from private property
held open to the public, it becomes clear that the first amendment
rights protected by the Constitution of the United States occupy a
preferred position over a private property owner's right to exclude
only when said property possesses all the characteristics of a
municipality.39
B. State Decisions
Some state courts have interpreted their own constitutions as
providing greater expressional rights than those protected by the
federal constitution.40 In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,4'
the California Supreme Court concluded that the California Con-
stitution4 2 protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised,
in privately owned shopping centers to which the public is in-
vited.43 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
36. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 509 (1976).
37. Id. at 518. The Court recognized that "'[A]bove all else, the First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content,' . . . [Tiherefore, that if the re-
spondents in the Lloyd case did not have a First Amendment right to enter that shop-
ping center to distribute handbills concerning Vietnam, then the pickets in the present
case did not have a First Amendment right to enter this shopping center for the pur-
pose of advertising their strike against the Butler Shoe Co." Id at 520-21 (citation
omitted).
38. Id. at 521.
39. See supra note 30. Justice Black's dissent in Logan Valley represents the state
of the law today following Hudgens.
40. See supra note 4.
41. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
42. CALIF. CONST. art. I § 2(a) provides: "Every person may freely speak, write
and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."
43. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910,592 P.2d 341,347,
153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979). Plaintiff Robins and several of his high school friends
entered the Pruneyard Shopping Center in order to obtain signatures on a petition to
be sent to the White House protesting a United Nations resolution against "Zionism."
They were then told by a security guard that they would have to leave the premises.
Plaintiff left the premises and subsequently brought suit to enjoin the shopping center
[Vol. 20
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Robins decision.44
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v.
Schmid,45 interpreted their own state constitution46 as providing
greater "speech and assembly" rights than those granted by the
federal constitution.4 7 Schmidinvolved the arrest of a member of
the United States Labor Party on criminal trespass charges.
4 8
Schmid was, at the time of his arrest, distributing political materi-
als on the campus of Princeton University, which is a private non-
profit academic institution.49 Schmid, who was not a student at
Princeton, was convicted of trespass under the state's penal tres-
pass statute.50 The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed
Schmid's conviction, relying on the Pruneyard principle that the
more private property is dedicated to public use, the more it must
"accomodate" individual rights. 51 The Schmid court came to its
decision after analyzing both the public function doctrine of
Marsh52 and the functional equivalent doctrine of Logan Valley,
finding neither applicable to the university setting.53 The court
concluded that rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
state constitution are protectable not only against governmental
bodies, but under some circumstances, against private persons as
well.54 The court relied on the extent of Princeton's dedication of
its campus to public use in order to determine the nature of the
restrictions that may be placed upon the private owner's enjoy-
ment of the incidents of ownership.55 It appears that the result of
the Schmid decision was to create a forced right of access and use
by private parties of the private property of another where none
previously existed.56
from further violating their freedom of speech as protected by the California
Constitution.
44. See generally Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
45. 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
46. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6 provides in part: "Every person may freely speak,
write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the
press."
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I, provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
48. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. at 538, 423 A.2d at 616.
49. Id
50. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:18-3(b) (West 1980).
51. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. at 562, 423 A.2d at 629.
52. Id at 549, 423 A.2d at 622.
53. Id
54. Id at 560, 423 A.2d at 628.
55. Id at 561, 423 A.2d at 629.
56. See generally Note, State Constitution Creates Right ofAccess to Private Prop-
erty Independent of Federal Constitution, 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 76 (1981).
1984]
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The standard set forth in Schmid was a major consideration of
the New Jersey Supreme Court in its Uston decision.
III. FACTS OF USTON
On January 30, 1979, Resorts International Hotel barred Plain-
tiff Kenneth Uston from playing blackjack in its casino solely for
the reason that he was a professional card counter.57 This move
prompted an industry-wide policy to ban card counters. Each ca-
sino maintained a list of persons to be barred as card counters.5 8
Uston appealed Resorts' action to the New Jersey Casino Con-
trol Commission.5 9 The Commission, relying principally on a de-
cision by the former Supreme Court of New Jersey, Gar(fine v.
Monmouth Park Jockey Club,60 held that Resorts had a common
law right to exclude any person it chose, for whatever reason it
chose,61 so long as the exclusion did not violate state or federal
civil rights laws.62
The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division reversed the
Commissions decision. 63 The appellate division based its decision
57. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370, 372 (1982). A card
counter keeps track of the playing cards through use of his memory and increases his
wages accordingly when the odds are in his favor. This practice is not considered
cheating, nor is it illegal. See K. USTON, THE BIG PLAYER (1977).
58. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 89 N.J. at 167, 445 A.2d at 372. Presently, every
jurisdiction in the world with established casino gambling, except New Jersey and
Makua, a Portuguese colony in East Africa, permits the casino exclusion of card
counters.
59. Id.
60. 29 N.J. 47, 148 A.2d 1 (1959). Garfi.ne involved the exclusion of a would be
patron from the Monmouth Park race track, by security guards employed by the race
track. Garifme filed suit seeking injunctive relief against his further exclusion from
the track. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that under common law, innkeep-
ers and common carriers are obliged to serve the public without discrimination, but
operators of most other businesses, including places of amusement such as race tracks,
are under no such obligation. Therefore, the race track operator could exclude
Garifme for any reason, so long as the exclusion was not based on race, creed, color,
national origin or ancestry.
61. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 89 N.J. at 167, 445 A.2d at 372.
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1981), provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-2 OVest 1971), provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction
of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facili-
ties and privileges of any places of public accommodation, resort or amusement, sub-
ject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to
all persons."
63. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 179 N.J. Super. 223, 431 A.2d 173 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1981).
9
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upon their interpretation of Section 5:12-71a 64 of the New Jersey
Casino Control Act, which dealt with regulations requiring exclu-
sion of certain persons.
In interpreting this provision, the appellate division stated: "It
is manifest by the terms of the above section that it is the Commis-
sion which is solely vested with the authority to designate persons
to be excluded from the casinos, under reasonable standards first
established by the Commission. f65
The appellate division held that even if Garjflne66 does espouse
a common law right in a gambling casino to exclude or expel any
person, for any reason, not in violation of state or federal civil
rights acts, such common law right has been abrogated by the
foregoing provisions of the Casino Control Act.67 Therefore, only
the Casino Control Commission is empowered to exclude patrons
from participating in licensed casino games.68 Until the commis-
sion promulgates a rule excluding card counters, Uston must be
permitted to engage in the game of blackjack whenever offered at
Resorts. 69
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the holding of this
lower court decision. 70 However, they interpreted the Casino
Control Act, N.J.S.A. Section 5:12-71a, somewhat differently than
did the appellate division. Where the appellate division inter-
preted this provision as completely abrogating Resorts' right to
exclude, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the statute only
64. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-71a (West 1982). The portions of the statute perti-
nent to the court's decision provide:
a. The commission shall, by regulation, provide for the establishment of a
list of persons who are to be excluded or ejected from any licensed casino
establishment. Such provisions shall define the standards for exclusion, and
shall include standards relating to persons:
(1) Who are career or professional offenders as defined by regulation of
the commission;
(2) Who have been convicted of a criminal offense under the laws of any
state or the United States, which is punishable by more than 6 months in
prison, or any crime or offense involving moral turpitude; or
(3) Whose presence in a licensed casino would, in the opinion of the com-
mission, be inimical to the interest of the state of New Jersey or the licensed
gaming therein, or both.
The commission shall promulgate definitions establishing those categories
of persons who shall be excluded pursuant to this section, including cheats
and persons whose privileges for licensure have been revoked.
65. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 179 N.J. Super. at 227, 431 A.2d at 175.
66. Garifme v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47, 148 A.2d 1 (1959).
67. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 179 N.J. Super. at 227, 431 A.2d at 175.
68. See Uston v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 448 F. Supp. 116, 119 (D. Nev. 1978).
United States District Court interpreted a Nevada statute, NEv. REv. STAT. § 463.151
(1983), virtually identical to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-71 (West 1982) as having no
bearing on whether casinos have the power to exclude card counters.
69. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 179 N.J. Super. at 227, 431 A.2d at 175.
70. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982).
19841
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abrogated Resorts' right to exclude patrons based upon their strat-
egies for playing licensed casino games.71
Although the court's interpretation of N.J.S.A. Section 5:12-7 1a
was determinative of the issue of whether Resorts could exclude
Uston for his strategy of playing blackjack, they felt compelled to
decide the precise extent of Resorts' common law right to exclude
patrons not covered by the statute.72
IV. ANALYSIS OF USTON V RESORTS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL
The Uston court began its decision by acknowledging that at
one time an absolute right of exclusion prevailed in New Jersey.73
However, it seems that this statement was offered more for rea-
sons of prior deference by the New Jersey courts to the noted Eng-
lish precedent of Wood v. Leadbitter, than for reasons of policy.74
In Wood v. Leadbitter,75 the Court of Exchequer did not deal
with an exclusion, but with an ejection from a public horserace
track.76 The plaintiff had purchased his ticket and entered the
grounds, then refused to leave when asked to do so because of
some alleged misconduct on a former occasion.77 After being for-
cibly ejected, he sued in trespass for assault and false imprison-
ment.78 In denying recovery, the court took the position that the
plaintiff had no easement 9 or similar property right entitling him
to remain on the grounds after the request to leave had been
made.80 Instead, he held only a personal license which could be
revoked at any time.8 ' The court held that the plaintiffs only
remedy was a claim for breach of contract.82
71. Id at 167, 445 A.2d at 372.
72. Id Although N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-71(a) (West 1982) abrogated Resorts'
right to exclude patrons based on their strategies of playing licensed casino games, the
casino control commission's opinion implied that absent supervening statutes, the
owners of places open to the public enjoy an absolute right to exclude patrons without
good cause.
73. Id at 171, 445 A.2d at 374.
74. Id
75. 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (Ex. 1845).
76. Id at 352.
77. Id
78. Id
79. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 457 (5th ed. 1979). An easement is an interest
in land permitting a right of use over the property of another. It is distinguishable
from a "license" which merely confers personal privilege to do some act on the land.
See infra note 81.
80. Wood v. Leadbitter, 153 Eng. Rep. 351, 355 (Ex. 1845).
81. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (5th ed. 1979). A license with respect to
real property is a privilege to go on premises for a certain purpose, but does not
operate to confer on, or vest in, licensee any title, interest, or estate in such property.
82. Wood v. Leadbitter, 153 Eng. Rep. at 359; Marrone v. Washington Jockey
Club, 227 U.S. 633, 636 (1913). A ticket purchased to enter a race track is a legally
binding contract. The purchaser is obligated to pay a valuable consideration for the
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The Uston court then looked at Shubert v. Nixon Amusement
Co.,8 3 a New Jersey Supreme Court decision. 84 The plaintiff in
Shubert, a theatrical producer, purchased a ticket for a show of his
competitor, Florenz Ziegfield.85 After he took his seat, and while
occupying it peacefully, he was asked to leave.86 The plaintiff
then filed a tort action against Ziegfield and Nixon Amusement
Company seeking damages for injury to his good name and for
being ejected from the theater.87 Taking note that the plaintiff
made no allegation of exclusion on the basis of race, color or pre-
vious condition of servitude,8s the Shubert court concluded:
In view of the substantially uniform approval of, and reliance
on, the decision in Wood v. Leadbitter in our state adjudica-
tions, it must fairly be considered to be adopted as part of our
jurisprudence; and whatever views may be entertained as to the
natural justice or injustice of ejecting a theater patron without
reason, after he has paid for his ticket and taken his seat, we
feel constrained to follow that decision as the settled law.89
In developing its' rationale for limiting an amusement place
owner's right to exclude, the Uston court stated "it hardly bears
mention that our common law has evolved in the intervening 70
years since Shubert. In fact, Leadbitter itself was disapproved
three years after the Shubert decision by Hurst v. Picture Theatres
Limited."90 However, any reliance by the court on Hurst as au-
thority for limiting Resorts International Hotel's right to exclude
patrons from its casino seems misplaced.
In Hurst v. Picture Theatres Limited,91 another English decision,
the court rejected the holding in Leadbitter and allowed recovery
in an assault action by the purchaser of a theatre ticket who was
forcibly ejected by the proprietor acting on the mistaken belief
that the plaintiff had not paid his admission fee.92 The court held
that it would be neither logical nor good law to hold that a theatre
proprietor had the absolute right to eject a patron who hadpaidfor
his ticket and was peaceably occupying his assigned seat. The the-
atre ticket was deemed to be a license bearing an agreement not to
ticket which is in effect a license to enter the race track grounds and the seller is
obligated not to revoke the license. See infra note 94.
83. 83 N.J.L. 101, 83 A. 369 (1912).
84. Uston, 89 N.J. at 172, 445 A.2d at 374.
85. Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 N.J.L. at 101, 83 A. at 369.
86. Id Apparently, Ziegfield did not want his competitor, Shubert, to view the
play he was producing.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id at 106, 83 A. at 371.
90. Uston, 89 N.J. at 172, 445 A.2d at 374.
91. 1 K.B. 1 (1914).
92. Id at 2.
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revoke which equity would enforce. 93 It is apparent that the
touchstone of the Hurst opinion is that the plaintiff had paid for
his ticket. This payment provided the consideration for the agree-
ment not to revoke the license, which equity would enforce. 94 A
casino patron pays no admission fee,95 and therefore obtains no
agreement which would be enforceable in equity.96 Absent the
payment of admission, a patron possesses only a license, which is
revocable at the will of the owner who granted it.97
The Uston court intimated that the common law of New Jersey
regarding the amusement place owner's right to exclude has con-
sistently evolved in the seventy years since the 1912 Shubert deci-
sion.98 However, it seems that absolutely no decision existed
justifying this statement until the ruling of State v. Schmid9 in
1980. At least until 1959, when Garfine'0° was decided, the court
had not abandoned its holding in Shubert.101
The critical point relied on in Uston to limit Resorts' right to
exclude is the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in State v. Schmid.10 2 In Schmid, it was held that, "the
more property is devoted to public use, the more it must accom-
modate the rights which inhere in individual members of the gen-
eral public who use that property."103 Applying this principle, the
Uston court held that since Uston did not threaten the security of
any casino occupant or disrupt the functioning of casino opera-
tions, he possesses the usual right of reasonable access to Resorts
International's blackjack tables.'t 4 In other words, since Resorts
International Hotel granted the right of access to their casino to
the general public, they cannot unreasonably exclude members of
the public wishing to gamble in their casino.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in equating its decision in
Uston with the principle enunciated in Schmid, failed to recognize
that it was the nature of Schmid's expressional activities which
93. Id. at 9.
94. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts, § 4-1 (2d ed. 1977). As a condition to the
enforceability of a contract, the common law usually requires that informal promises
be made for a consideration. The essence of consideration is legal detriment that has
been bargained for and exchanged for the promise.
95. Admission to the ten casinos presently established in Atlantic City is free.
96. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts, § 16-9 (2d ed. 1977). The rules for the
presence or absence of consideration are basically the same in equity as in law.
97. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
98. Uston, 89 N.J. at 172, 445 A.2d at 374.
99. 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
100. Garifme v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47, 148 A.2d 1 (1959).
101. Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 N.J.L. 101, 83 A. 369 (1912).
102. Uston, 89 N.J. at 172, 445 A.2d at 374.
103. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 562, 423 A.2d 615, 629 (1980).
104. Us/on, 89 N.J. at 174, 445 A.2d at 375.
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raised them to the level protected by the state constitution. As the
United States Supreme Court held in Marsh, when constitutional
rights of owners of property are balanced against those of the peo-
ple to enjoy freedom of press and religion, "[w]e remain mindful
of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position."'10 5 There-
fore, the Schmid court was acting within reason when it limited
Princeton University's right to exclude the public who wished to
enter on the University's premises and exercise its constitutionally
protected right of expression. 0 6 However, in Uston, the court lim-
ited the casino's right to exclude when no such competing interest
was at stake.
The right of access to Resorts' blackjack tables which Uston
claimed is found in neither the federal or state constitutions, nor
in any statute enacted by the New Jersey legislature. 07 If Uston
wished to exercise his right of expression as protected by the New
Jersey Constitution,103 and was then excluded by Resorts, reliance
on the Schmid principal would be perfectly in order. However,
Uston was not being excluded for attempting to exercise any con-
stitutionally protected right. 10 9 Therefore, by creating a right of
access to play blackjack, Uston has raised such right to a level
more worthy of protection than the federally protected right of
exclusion. 1o0
V. CRITICISM OF THE USTON HOLDING
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in limiting Resorts Interna-
tional's right to exclude, has seemingly intruded into what appears
to be a legislative function. If the legislature of New Jersey had
intended to create a right to gamble, and more specifically to play
blackjack, it would have passed legislation creating such a right.
Since it has remained silent in regard to the rule espoused in
Garfi'ne,1' 1 it can be implied that it is their intention that private
property owners should enjoy the common law right of exclusion.
Therefore, it seems the Uston court interfered with the intentions
of the legislature by placing limitations on the private property
owner's right to exclude where none previously existed.
105. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
106. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6.
107. The right of access which Uston claimed is implied from the invitation made
by Resorts International Hotel to the general public to come and gamble in their
casino.
108. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6.
109. Neither the United States nor the New Jersey constitutions mention the right
to play blackjack or the right not to be excluded from another's private property.
110. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Ill. Garifmie v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47, 148 A.2d 1 (1959). See
supra note 60.
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A further difficulty with the Uston opinion is in the court's
statement that "property owners have no legitimate interest in un-
reasonably excluding particular members of the public when they
open their premises for public use.""l2 This statement implies that
since Uston's presence in the casino neither threatens the security
of casino occupants nor disrupts the functioning of the casino, the
decision to exclude him is unreasonable. 13 Although the court
recognizes that the reasonableness of a casino's decision to ex-
clude a would be patron is a question of fact which must be de-
cided on a case by case basis," 4 the Uston court apparently did
not fully consider the reasonableness of Resorts' decision to ex-
clude Uston.
A casino provides amusement and entertainment. Instead of a
patron paying for this entertainment in advance as one would do,
for example, at a theater or sporting event, he pays for it during
the course of his play. This occurs as a result of the house advan-
tage built into the rules of each casino game. 115 However, card
counters, such as Uston, with their unique technique of playing
blackjack, have a built-in advantage over the house.16 This
player advantage assures that, over a period of time, the exper-
ienced counter will win." 7 Therefore, it seems quite reasonable
for a casino to exclude a card counter. No business should be
forced to sell its product at a guaranteed loss which is what the
casinos must do if they cannot bar card counters. Places of en-
tertainment such as concert halls, sporting events, and theaters are
run for the purpose of being profitable to the owners. If they are
not profitable, they will cease to exist. Since a casino is no differ-
ent than other forums which provide entertainment for profit, in
order for the game of blackjack to be profitable, the casinos must
be able to exclude card counters." 8 Since no person has a vested
right to win at a casino game, Resorts' exclusion of Uston was
112. Us/on, 89 N.J. at 173, 445 A.2d at 375.
113. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
114. Uston, 89 N.J. at 174, 445 A.2d at 375.
115. Petitioner's Supplemental Brief at 6, Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, 89 N.J. 163,
445 A.2d 370 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Supplemental Brief] [copy on file in the
offices of California Western Law Review]. "A general public blackjack player will,
over the long run, experience a net loss of between 0.85 and 1.0 unit bets per hour
while playing blackjack. Thus, if the player is placing $10.00 bets, his play will cost
him between $8.50 and $10.00 per hour." Id.
116. See generally K. USTON, ONE THIRD OF A SHOE (1979). This technique in-
volves the player adding in his head or electronically, I for each low-value card (2's
through 9's) dealt and -I for each high-value card (10's and face cards) dealt. When
the running count is a positive number, the remaining cards are favorable to the
player, the higher the plus count the greater the player's advantage and the house's
disadvantage.
117. Supplemental Brief, supra note 115, at 9.
118. Id. at 5. In a 13-day period in 1979, during which the commission permitted
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reasonable to protect its return on investment. A finding by the
court that Uston's exclusion was reasonable so that the casinos
could continue to run their blackjack tables at a profit would have
allowed the casinos to continue excluding counters.
Finally, the state legislature of New Jersey delegated to the Ca-
sino Control Commission, because of its expertise in gambling af-
fairs, the widest latitude in its regulation of the casino industry.' 19
It is evident that the legislature intended the Casino Control Com-
mission's judgment, on matters concerning casino gambling, to be
afforded the greatest possible weight.120 The Uston court, in com-
ing to their decision, ignored the scope of judicial review to be
applied to an appeal from an administrative agency. The role of
the court in such review is limited to a finding of whether or not
the expert agency, entrusted with regulatory responsibility, has
taken an irrational or arbitrary view of the evidence presented to
it.121 If the action taken by the commission is not irrational or
arbitrary, then the agency's action must be affirmed. 122 In light of
Section 5:12-100 of the Casino Control Act, which provides in
part:
All gaming shall be conducted according to rules promul-
gated by the commission. All wagers and pay-offs of winning
wagers at table games shall be made according to rules promul-
gated by the commission, which shall establish such minimum
wagers and other limitations as may be necessary to assure the
vitality of casino operations and fair odds to and maximum par-
ticipation by casino patrons... ; 123
The decision by the Casino Control Commission permitting the
casinos to exclude card counters should not have been reversed.
The fact that Resorts International Hotel and Caesar's Palace,
the only two licensed casinos at the time, lost 1.4 million dollars to
card counters during a 13-day trial period in 1979 when card
counters were permitted to play blackjack, 24 should have been
sufficient evidence of the rationality behind the commission's de-
card counters to gamble, Resorts International Hotel and Caeser's Palace estimated
their losses to card counters at 1.4 million dollars.
119. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-75 (West 1982) provides: "The commission may ex-
ercise any proper power or authority necessary to perform the duties assigned to it by
law, and no specific enumeration of powers in this act shall be read to limit the au-
thority of the commission to administer this act."
120. Respondent's Brief at 8, Uston v. Resorts International Hotel, 179 N.J. Super.
223, 431 A.2d 173 (198 1), [copy on file in offices of California Western Law Review].
121. Unimed, Inc. v. Richardson, 458 F.2d 787, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Motyka v.
McCorkle, 58 N.J. 165, 276 A.2d 129 (1971). Holding that agency commissioner's
action is entitled to the benefit of the rebuttable presumption of validity afforded to
administrative regulations generally.
122. Motyka v. McCorkle, 58 N.J. 165, 276 A.2d 129 (1971).
123. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-100(e) (West 1982) (emphasis added).
124. See supra note 118.
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cision to subsequently allow the casinos to bar card counters. Al-
lowing the casinos to exclude card counters must be considered a
rational method of assuring the vitality of casino operations in
light of the large sums of money guaranteed to be lost to the pro-
fessional card counter. Therefore, the Uston court should have
affirmed the commission's decision.
VI. POLICY AGAINST ACCEPTANCE OF THE USTON HOLDING
The main purposes behind initiating casino gaming in New
Jersey were to provide economic recovery for a deteriorating area,
as well as to provide tax revenues for the state.1 25 The key to
achieving these goals is successful casino gaming and the ensuing
profits it generates. 126 The amount of tax which the casino must
turn over to the state is directly tied to the casino's gross reve-
nues. 127 If the gross profits of the casinos fall, so also do the tax
revenues the state derives from the casino industry. Blackjack is
the most popular casino game and currently accounts for almost
one-half of the casino's gross profits. 128 Since professional card
counters employ a method of playing blackjack in which they are
guaranteed a substantial win over a period of time, their presence
at a casino blackjack table means an automatic reduction in the
tax revenues received by the state. The Uston court's holding puts
at risk the goals of casino gaming. If the Uston court had permit-
ted the casinos to bar card counters, the legislative goals would
surely be preserved. 129
The casinos themselves are at a loss to cure the situation. Their
only remedy would be to remove all of the blackjack tables from
their casino. However, they lack the authority to do so since the
Casino Control Act requires "at least four blackjack tables for
each 10,000 square feet of casino space."' 30 Therefore, the best a
casino operator could do to protect his profits, as well as the state
tax revenues, is to limit the amount of blackjack tables to the stat-
utory nimum.
Since New Jersey casinos are now powerless to exclude card
counters, it is up to the Casino Control Commission to promul-
gate rules of play which minimize the card counter's advantage.
One rule put into effect by the commission following the Uston
decision allows the casinos to shuffle the cards at will.' 3' While
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1-12-152 (West 1982).
126. Id
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-144 (West 1982).
128. Supplemental Brief, supra note 115, at 10.
129. Tax revenue otherwise lost to card counters will be retained by the state.
130. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-100(j) (West 1982).
131. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19, § 47-2.5 (1982).
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this rule may have the effect of minimizing the card counter's win-
nings it also reduces the speed of the game by lessening the
amount of hands that can be played during any given time period.
Since the casinos depend on their small house advantage over an
infinite number of hands for their revenues, any reduction of the
speed of the game immediately diminishes casino profits and state
tax revenues.
1 32
At the same time, this "shuffle-at-will" rule has the potential of
working an undue advantage in favor of the casinos. Since the
casino dealers can count cards as well as patrons, it is likely the
casinos will hire dealers who are themselves card counters. If the
dealer is counting cards and is also able to shuffle at will, he will
shuffle the deck whenever the odds become favorable to the ca-
sino patrons, thereby greatly increasing the house advantage.
While this might even up the score between the casino and the
professional card counters, it would virtually eliminate the recrea-
tional player's opportunities to win. 33 This would be contrary to
the fair odds provision of the Casino Control Act. 134
One question left open by Uston is whether or not the Casino
Control Act empowers the commission to exclude card coun-
ters.135 The court's suggestion that the commission promulgate
such a rule will almost certainly have a detrimental effect on the
taxpayers of New Jersey. If the commission promulgates a rule
excluding card counters, any exclusion pursuant to that rule will
involve state action,' 36 thus invoking the due process guarantees
of the fourteenth amendment. 37 Therefore, any patron barred
pursuant to the commission's rule authorizing such exclusions will
be entitled to a due process hearing at the inconvenience of the
commission and the expense of the taxpayers. 38 The hearing
would be unnecessary and the attendant cost upon the taxpayers
avoided if the casinos were permitted to retain their common law
right of exclusion.
132. Supplemental Brief, supra note 115, at 12. The house advantage in Atlantic
City at blackjack is .54 percent (.54%).
133. Id.
134. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-100 (West 1982). Seesupranote 123 and accompany-
ing text.
135. Uston, 89 N.J. at 174, 445 A.2d at 375.
136. See generally Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part: "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
138. Supplemental Brief, supra note 115, at 32.
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VII. ALTERNATIVES TO USTON's HOLDING
The Uston court had two possible alternatives by which they
could have attained the same result of prohibiting the exclusion of
card counters from the casinos without intruding on a private
property owner's right of exclusion.
The first of these alternatives would have been for the Uston
court to conclude that sufficient involvement existed between Re-
sorts International Hotel and the state to hold the casino to be
public rather than private property. 139 Resorts then, acting nomi-
naly as the state, could not have excluded Uston because it would
constitute a deprivation of liberty without due process as pro-
tected by the United States Constitution.1 40 The Supreme Court
of the United States has held that mere state regulation of a pri-
vate industry in and of itself does not constitute state action. 14'
Nevertheless, more state involvement is present here than mere
regulation. In Section 1 of the Casino Control Act, 142 the state
legislature found that casino gambling was permitted in New
Jersey for the dual purposes of revitalizing the state's tourist trade
and renewing the luster of Atlantic City.14 3 In furtherance of
these purposes, state revenues were to be augmented by a tax of
eight to twelve percent on gross gaming revenues and an addi-
tional investment obligation of two percent. 144 Further, the Ca-
sino Control Act declares the public policy of New Jersey to be
"that the institution of licensed casino establishments in New
Jersey be strictly regulated and controlled."'145 In view of the
state's relationship to the casino industry, there seems to be suffi-
cient evidence to support a finding that the state be considered a
joint participant in the casino industry. Therefore, an exclusion of
a potential casino patron would necessarily involve state action
requiring due process guarantees be afforded the excluded
139. Such a holding automatically would have involved a state action analysis.
See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
140. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV provides in part: "nor shall any state deprive any
citizen of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See generally
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). (Holding that before a state could deprive a
welfare recipient of benefits, a pretermination hearing must be provided the recipient
to satisfy the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
141. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
142. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 to 5:12-152 (West 1982).
143. Id.
144. Id at § 5:12-144. The "Investment Obligation" requires the casinos to invest
a percentage of their net profits in the urban renewal of Atlantic City. The "Invest-
ment Obligation" can be satisfied by the purchase of municipal bonds that could be
used to finance redevelopment projects. Asbury Park Press, December 5, 1982, at AI,
col. 1.
145. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(13) (West 1982). The Uston court admits that "the
Commission's regulation of Blackjack is more extensive than the entire administrative
regulation of many industries." Uston, 89 N.J. at 169, 445 A.2d at 373.
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patron. 146
The second alternative would have been a finding that the oper-
ation of Resorts International Hotel was essentially a public func-
tion as delineated in Marsh.147 Compared with the company town
in Marsh, Resorts contains many of the same attributes, including
gift and clothing stores, restaurants, lounges where entertainment
is provided, a casino, a bank, hotel rooms, etc. A finding by the
court that Resorts was performing a public function would have
subjected it to state regulation. Therefore, some procedural due
process, that is, notice and hearing, must be afforded whenever a
card counter is sought to be excluded. 48
A finding by the court that Resorts International Hotel was
public property or performing a public function would have seem-
ingly been a more favorable conclusion than the result reached,
that is, creating a forced right of access to another's private prop-
erty. Such a holding would have precluded Resorts from barring
a potential patron unless they provided him with a due process
hearing.149 Meanwhile, since Resorts would be considered public
property, the private property owner's right of exclusion as previ-
ously recognized would be preserved.
CONCLUSION
As more states consider establishing legalized casino gaming, 50
the issue of whether the casinos should be permitted to exclude
the above average gambler from their premises will become of ut-
most importance to the state gambling commissions. When for-
mulating a decision, a commission should be mindful of the
purposes behind casino gaming, namely to provide economic re-
covery in the form of increased employment, a revitalized tourist
trade, building renovation, and also to provide state tax revenues.
The purpose is not to line the pockets of the professional gambler.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Uston v. Resorts Interna-
tional Hotel has held that a gambling casino may not exclude a
potential patron without a showing that he threatens the security
of another casino occupant or disrupts the function of casino oper-
146. But see Uston v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 448 F. Supp. 116 (D. Nev. 1978) where
Federal District Court in Nevada found no state action involved in a casino's exclu-
sion of a potential patron.
147. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See supra note 24 and accompany-
ing text.
148. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
149. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
150. Presently New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, Washington, Louisiana, North
Dakota, California, and Massachusetts are considering the effect casino gaming
would have in their jurisdictions.
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ations.' 5t In doing so, the court was apparently unmindful of
these policy considerations. Without constitutional, statutory, or
case law authority, the New Jersey Supreme Court decision se-
verely impinges upon the common law right of exclusion belong-
ing to owners of private property. In coming to their decision the
Us/on court not only rejected over one hundred years of property
law, but rejected it completely in the face of the legislature's eco-
nomic policy behind establishing casino gaming.
There are situations in which the right of private property own-
ers to exclude whomever they please from their premises must
give way to the public's need of access to their premises. The de-
cisions prior to Uston which have limited the right to exclude have
either involved a constitutional' 52 or statutory 53 right belonging
to the public who wished to enter the private property held open
to the public, or involved the rule applicable to persons engaged
in public callings such as innkeepers or common carriers.154 The
rationale behind these limitations on the property owners make
them reasonable. Where a constitutional right is at stake, the
property owner's interest must yield to the policy favoring free
exercise of the public's constitutional rights. Likewise, the public's
need of access to services such as hotels and the various forms of
transportation justifies a decision requiring the owners of private
property to serve the public without discrimination. However, no
constitutional or statutory right exists to gamble, or more specifi-
cally, to play blackjack.
The Uston decision cannot be reconciled with earlier decisions
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey which limit a property
owner's right of exclusion. The Uston case did not present any
comparable competing interest on the part of a potential patron
which would justify imposing a rule limiting a private property
owner's right to exclude. The courts should not have the power to
force a right of access to private property so that unwilling owners
151. Uston, 89 N.J. at 174, 445 A.2d at 375.
152. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
153. See State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971). State statute prohibited
a private property owner from barring access to governmental services available to
migrant workers living on the premises. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:170-31 (West 1971).
154. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. Even though Resorts Interna-
tional Hotel can be considered an inn in the common law sense, the rule applicable to
innkeepers cannot be applied in the present case. The relationship between Resorts
and Uston was not one of innkeeper and patron, but rather one of casino owner and
prospective gambler. Therefore, the policies upon which the innkeeper's duty to serve
without discrimination rest are not present. See Uston v. Airport Casinos, Inc., 564
F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1977).
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are forced to accommodate persons with whom they have chosen
not to deal.
Marc S. Schechter*
* The author was honored with the Scriba Regis Award by the 1982-83 Board
of Editors of the CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REvIEw. This Note was considered the
best written student article of the year. The 1983-84 Board of Editors congratulate
Mr. Schechter for this achievement.
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